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About the project
PRECOBIAS is a campaign project that centres around the mental pro-
cesses and cognitive biases at play when youngsters are faced with extre-
mist or terrorist discourses on social media.
By enhancing the digital resilience and critical thinking of our target au-
dience, we want to counter radicalisation in the long term. PRECOBIAS 
helps youngsters to understand themselves better by revealing the un-
derlying mental processes and cognitive biases that shape their interpre-
tations and analyses. 
To reach these objectives, PRECOBIAS targets:
- vulnerable and radicalized youngsters. 
HOW? Through a social media campaign with videos, an Instagram con-
test and a self-test to increase awareness of cognitive biases.
- social workers and teachers who are in charge of the target youngsters.
HOW?  By offering a MOOC on cognitive biases and radicalisation, as well 
as two toolkits with ready-to-use activities.
PRECOBIAS involves partners from 6 EU countries (Belgium, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia). 
PRECOBIAS comprises scientific research on cognitive biases and radica-
lisation on social media, conducted by researchers from Universiteit Gent 
and LMU, in collaboration with researchers from KUL and Textgain. This 
report sums up our main findings.
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Precobias – report
1) Why does PRECOBIAS focus on radicalization and 
cognitive biases? 
Radicalization is typically described as an increasing extremity of beliefs, 
feelings, and behaviours in support of conflict and, potentially, violence.1 
The radicalization process is based on a set of complex factors that need 
to coincide in order to actually produce extremist outcomes.2  Yet, con-
frontation with extremist propaganda material or hate speech is com-
monly seen as potentially conducive.³  Therefore, it seems important to 
first investigate what extremist communication looks like before we can 
draw conclusions about its potential effects.⁴  Rather than focusing on 
what extremists post online, it is key to understand how they commu-
nicate and how we process that information, in order to understand ex-
tremists’ use of psychological forces to radicalize potential sympathizers. 
Cognitive biases play a very practical and important role in the way we 
process information. They shape the way we think and behave, and they 
act on an unconscious level. Most people are unaware of the fact that 
their thinking or behavior is steered by cognitive biases. These biases are 
not uncommon, nor are they bugs in our cognitive functioning. They are 
necessary and automatic processes that allow us to process information 
and make sensible decisions in our day-to-day lives.5 In PRECOBIAS, we 
hypothesize that online extremist narratives can trigger cognitive biases 
in users.
2) What was the focus of our research questions?
The project wants to examine the cognitive biases that play a role in 
exposure to extremist communication, and how they might push people 
into holding more radicalized opinions. The project targets radicalization 
in the political as well as in the religious sense. This is why our strategic fo-
cus lies on both non-official Islam-based extremist communication (see 
Question 3) and on right-wing extremists (see Question 8). We analyzed 
the specific patterns and narratives that are used in extremist communi-
cation and that might activate biases when people process information. 
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In an effect-based examination (see Question 12) we then built on these 
identified patterns to examine 1) how extremist communication can trig-
ger cognitive biases and 2) how the activation of those cognitive biases 
might make people more vulnerable to extremist ideas. 
3) Why does PRECOBIAS focus on non-official Islam-ba-
sed extremist communication?
Europol deals solely with official propaganda content posted by desi-
gnated terrorist organizations. Content published by private IS suppor-
ters, who play a major role in extremist propaganda on social media, falls 
beyond the scope of official monitoring and is left for other stakeholders 
to address. The same goes for academic research, the majority of which 
covers only official propaganda (IS magazines, videos, etc.). Research on 
the effect of cognitive biases in radicalization is typically centred around 
established IS frames (e.g. ingroup versus outgroup) and rarely addresses 
how unofficial communication may trigger specific cognitive biases.
We argue that, in addition to official IS communication, Salafist extremi-
sts’ propaganda on social media can also play a key role in Islam-based 
radicalization. In particular, these extremist profiles can be “dormant cel-
ls”6,  who share mostly non-violent content on their public profiles and mi-
ght additionally reach potential recruits or sympathizers through private 
messages. Since user-generated content can be uploaded by non-official 
sources, it is relevant to focus on this communication as well in order to 
grasp the potential of extremist communication to trigger cognitive bia-
ses.
4) What social media posts did we analyze?
We analyzed over 3000 posts from eight Facebook and five Instagram 
profiles of Salafist extremists that contain text and image. These profiles 
are supporters of the globally active Jihadist movement, but they do not 
express adhesion to any extremist organization. The profiles vary in the size 
of the community, which is either unknown (i.e., private friends lists on Fa-
cebook) or ranges from 155 to 52 000 followers. We covered the period from 
October 2016 to October 2019, i.e. after 2015, the turning point when social 
media content regulations on extremist content increased significantly.
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5) What did we observe about topics and frames in 
Islam-based extremist propaganda?
The first step of PRECOBIAS’s research was to gain an insight into the to-
pics and frames used in Islam-based extremist propaganda (i.e., the con-
tent level, the ‘what’). To analyze the content level, we built our research 
design on Ingram’s publications in which he explains how the concepts 
of crisis, identity and solution interplay in IS propaganda.7 
5.1. CRISIS
5.1.1. The low salience of anti-outgroup posts
It is striking that most of the posts (between 76% and 100%) do not op-
pose ingroup and outgroup. The profiles do not appear to be fuelled by 
anti-outgroup frames as a key topic. In most profiles, these frames are just 
one of many topics and covered even less frequently than others.
5.1.2. Attacks on the ummah vs. the dilution of true Islam and/or the 
breakdown of religious traditions
The dilution of true Islam and/or the breakdown of traditions is a key 
topic in some of the profiles. Interestingly, the profiles that emphasize 
attacks against the ummah (i.e. the Muslim community) tend not to fo-
cus on the dilution of Islam and the breakdown of the traditions, and vice 
versa. 
Victimhood is a key frame in both official and unofficial propaganda. We 
observed several images of lethal victims (e.g. members of the prosecu-
ted Rohingya and Uighur minorities, as well as numerous pictures of inju-
red citizens, particularly children. Posts that frame Muslim prisoners as 
victims also fall within the category of attacks against the ummah. Their 
prison conditions are particularly denounced, with mentions of torture, 
medical negligence or detailed descriptions that create shocking visual 
representations in the reader’s mind (e.g., a Muslim prisoner forced to eat 
pork and drink toilet water). The stories about these prisoners are often 
taken out of their context. In many cases, the post first introduces a parti-
cular prisoner and then extends to Muslim prisoners in general. One pri-
soner acts as a symbol for a more general ingroup vs. outgroup confron-
tation, rather than a particular example that needs to be discussed. This 
strategy of decontextualization and positive framing allows the authors 
of the posts to circumvent Facebook’s terms of service. Most posts do 
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not praise the prisoners’ actions or beliefs, which is not allowed, but nine 
posts out of ten do consider their arrest and detention to be illegitimate.
5.2. IDENTITY
Extremism can also be fuelled by an identity construct, often through 
the framing of certain extremist figures as inspiring, usually in an implicit 
way. Extremist profiles use decontextualized quotes from extremist figu-
res that contain vague fight rhetoric. They subtly endorse those figures 
and put them in a positive frame (i.e. by listing the figure’s intellectual 
qualities). 
For example, mujahid Emir Khattab’s call to “free ourselves from the Arab 
leaders” (see quote below in French) might sound rather violent, but the 
violence is only implicit. These quotes are transformed into decontex-
tualized empty shells that are ready for hosting new implicit meanings 
according to the contexts in which they are used. 
We observed this same lack of explicitness in posts with identity images 
and symbols. There was never any explicit visual content referring to IS 
(flag, etc.); only implicit symbols that occur regularly in extremist com-
munication, but not exclusively.  (e.g. lion imagery).
5.3. SOLUTION
5.3.1. Caliphate as Islamic utopia
Not a single post of our corpus praises the caliphate, which is forbidden 
on Facebook and Instagram. However, it is praised implicitly in two posts 
Image 1: 
Reference to mujahid 
Emir Khattab in our 
corpus
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that lament one specific Muslim’s development, who used to be “pro-ca-
liphate” and “pro-sharia.” 
5.3.2. Violence as an explicit solution
We observed two types of posts in which violence is explicitly advocated 
as a solution against outgroups. The first type contains extracts from re-
ligious texts that are prone to violent jihad. Example 1: “He believes that 
Jihad continues from the time Allah sent Muhammad to the last group 
that will fight the dajall. They will not suffer any harm from the misdeeds 
and wrongdoers.” Example 2: “Hatred towards these polytheists, their cri-
ticism, takfir, disavowal, is the foundation of Islam and the greatest me-
ans of access to the Lord of the Worlds. Moreover, the life of a Muslim will 
have no pleasure except with the jihad against them, against their oppo-
sition and their takfir, and with approaching Allah with that, hoping for 
His reward.” Jihad is not framed positively through frames of adventure 
or camaraderie, but only evoked via religious texts. The second type of 
posts explicitly advocates certain terrorist acts.
Apart from these explicit cases that violate Facebook’s terms of service, 
many other cases manage to circumvent them, through five discourse 
strategies.
The first strategy is a pseudo-factual explanation and justification of the 
emergence of terrorist groups (e.g., the thousands of deaths in Syria, Iraq 
or Afghanistan, the tortures in American or secret prisons). Here, the post 
does not support terrorist acts, but does not condemn them either. They 
are presented as defensive violence, triggered by faults of the West.
The second strategy is the use of vague fight rhetoric, which leaves the 
door open for violent interpretations.
The third strategy is the use of extracts with only limited signs of endor-
sement. The author of the post reveals his approval in a very subtle way. 
Calls to divine violence are the fourth strategy: e.g., “May Allah hasten his 
punishment to all those tyrants who humiliate, torture, imprison and op-
press Muslims on earth.”  These excuses for divine violence do not violate 
Facebook’s terms of service, because as they remain abstract, whereas 
Facebook removes content only when “there is a genuine risk of physi-
cal harm or direct threats to public safety” (Terms of service). Advocating 
hypothetical future violence is another strategy that does not constitute 
a threat to security. 
Interestingly, the salience of the two frames that fuel extremist content 
the most (i.e. inspiring extremist figures and violence as solution) is very 
low: in nearly all the profiles, they take up around 1% of the posts, and ne-
ver more than 4%.
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6) Are there differences between Facebook and Insta-
gram for Islam-based extremist propaganda? 
Both within and across Facebook and Instagram, the profiles differ gre-
atly: they oppose different outgroups and combine the crisis-identity-so-
lution frames in different ways. Nevertheless, we observed four trends, 
which were relevant for both Facebook and Instagram:
- Profiles without or with hardly any ingroup vs. outgroup frames. They 
focus on non-extremist religious propaganda.
- Predominantly political profiles: the majority of posts is about attacks 
against the ummah; institutions are the main outgroup and the main vi-
sual strategy lies in the use of pictures, to denounce these attacks throu-
gh ideological realism.
- Predominantly religious profiles: the majority of posts is related to reli-
gious issues. Disbelievers and moderate Muslims are more often addres-
sed as outgroups than in the type above. 
- Profiles without thematic prevalence. 
Visual content was not very different across Facebook and Instagram. 
What is striking is that apologies for violence were very often expressed in 
long texts (and thus could easily remain undetected) rather than through 
visual content.
7) What did we observe about extremists’ communica-
tion styles/discourse patterns? 
In a second phase, we identified communication styles (i.e., the discourse 
level, the ‘how’) of Islam-based extremist propaganda. These are our fin-
dings:
7.1. Adhesion and identification
- Storytelling was particularly prevalent in several profiles. Typical instan-
ces were of oppression that serve as personified illustrations of more ge-
neral ideological opinions. These stories may fuel the reader’s sense of 
adhesion and identification, and thereby strengthen their connected-
ness to the propaganda.  
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7.2. Ingroup vs outgroup
- Extremist profiles use many negative Islam-based terms to express op-
position against outgroups. These terms are sometimes left untransla-
ted, possibly to increase legitimacy  and brotherhood,  which can fuel the 
psychological force of social bonding.
- These profiles do not particularly promote the ingroup’s identity in po-
sitive terms, which might favour identification or fuel the superiority bias. 
7.3. Emotion and stress 
- Emotion and stress are potential key mental processes, conjured by 
intensification. Up-scaling adverbs like ‘never’ or ‘always’ in posts about 
the outgroup emphasize the unsolvable incompatibility between the in-
group and the outgroup, avoiding any grey zone. 
- Visual intensification took the form of close-ups of the victims’ injuries. 
7.4. Preference for simplicity
- Intense crisis-related posts contrast with presuppositional, solution-re-
lated statements, which often take the form of short, religious princi-
ples (e.g., “Nationalism is scum”) or imperatives (e.g., “Don’t vote”), whi-
ch can further reinforce the polarization between the ingroup and the 
outgroup. This taken-for-grantedness might contribute to the audience’s 
projection bias, false consensus effect, bandwagon effect and/or Oc-
cam’s razor effect. In case of projection bias, the degree to which other 
people agree with oneself is overestimated. This bias is close to false-con-
sensus effect, where one’s own opinions are overestimated as the normal 
and typical ones. This social norming can also strengthen a bandwagon 
effect, whereby one increasingly adopts views and behaviours the more 
they have already been adopted by others, as well as Occam’s razor, whi-
ch is a preference for simplicity.
- Taken-for-grantedness can be expressed through various textual ar-
rangements, especially presupposition. For example, posts with literal 
religious doctrine, like “Halloween is shirk [disbelief]”, are formulated as 
presuppositional statements: they are not up for discussion and  can be 
treated as a ‘given’.10  When there is some implicit room for discussion, 
the writer may oppose alternative positions by presenting his views as hi-
ghly warrantable through “proclaim” strategies 11, i.e., emphases on their 
credibility (e.g., naturally, obviously, there can be no doubt that, of course) 
or endorsement formulations by which external sources are construed 
as undeniable (e.g., this document shows, demonstrates). These patterns 
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to state or increase credibility can also strengthen projection bias, false 
consensus effect and bandwagon effect, as well as Occam’s razor.
- The purpose of the vast majority of these posts is not to convince or to 
win the debate of ideas; their function is to denounce situations that are 
framed as presuppositional and taken for granted, with much recourse to 
intensification patterns. 
7.5. Social bonding and social norming
- The use of the inclusive pronouns ‘we’ and ‘our’ is prevalent. They help 
construct the ummah as an imagined homogenous ingroup commu-
nity, as opposed to the outgroup. This and the frequent address to the 
reader with the ‘you’ pronoun may also respond to the reader’s quest for 
social status within one’s collective). 
- Some posts were built upon the us vs. them opposition, often stren-
gthened by the outgroup’s gaze to the external viewer. This binary op-
position can foster polarization and the outgroup homogeneity effect, 
where individuals perceive the ingroup members as diverse but the out-
group members as more similar to one another. 
- Only one quarter of the pictures contain a visual address to an external 
reader. Pictures including gaze address (i.e. someone is looking into the 
lens) can be seen as a demand of virtual relations with the reader.12 The 
picture superiority effect is mostly used as intense visual evidence of 
oppression rather than as a tool for social norming (e.g. the famous “We 
want you…” slogan).  
Image 2: 
Us vs. them opposition 
in a post without visual 
address to an external 
viewer (“Yemen. Sweets 
for your children and 
bombs for us! Thank 
you, France.”)
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7.6. Authoritarianism
- Between one third and a half of the profiles’ posts were composed of 
quotes. Quotes written in sacred texts or by inspirational extremist figu-
res can trigger authoritarianism. 
- The high frequency of addresses to the reader with imperatives empha-
sizes how many of these posts are constructed as social norming, which 
can also fuel authoritarianism. For example, the post below uses a posi-
tive ingroup visual nomination in a call to “surround yourself with those 
who have the same mission as you”. 
7.7. Confirmation of existing beliefs
- The low frequency of confirmation patterns reveals that the vast majo-
rity of these posts are not constructed with linguistic patterns that might 
trigger confirmation bias, wherein people prefer messages that align 
with their existing beliefs. This is not surprising, given that confirmation 
patterns are very specific (compared to more common anti-outgroup ter-
ms, for example).
Image 3: 
Reference to the lion 
as ingroup’s positive 
nomination strategy
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8) Why did PRECOBIAS focus on right-wing extremism?
Like for Islam-based extremism, we sought to investigate to what extent 
and through what strategies extreme-right social movements or indivi-
duals have managed to share violent extremist content in text-image po-
sts on Facebook and Instagram in recent years (2017- 2020).
We analyzed 500 extreme-right Facebook and Instagram posts, all inclu-
ding text and visual content.
Since research focuses on the most established extreme-right political 
parties or social movements, we decided instead to analyze practices car-
ried out on a smaller scale, by relatively small groups or individuals, whose 
communication practices are not designed by political communication 
strategists but who, nevertheless, enjoy some popularity on Facebook or 
Instagram, and publish content quite regularly: 
- Facebook : Action Nationale et Radicale/ANR 1³
- Facebook : Le Parti nationaliste français – branche de Lyon /PNF 
- Instagram: Europa Invicta/EI 
- Instagram: Patrioten_nrw/NRW 
- Instagram: one account run by an extreme-right individual/I3. 
9) What did we learn about topics and frames in extre-
me right propaganda?
9.1. The high salience of anti-outgroup posts
The vast majority of the posts contain anti-outgroup feelings. Sometimes, 
they only use their logos to express such feelings. The frequency of an-
ti-outgroup feelings varies greatly across the profiles. 
Very often, posts cover a specific topic but then also contain a disparate 
multitude of hashtags, some covering mainstream ideas, while others re-
ferring to several outgroups.
9.2. Crisis, identity and solution constructs
Unsurprisingly, migration remains a core issue. Migration as a threat is 
often covered in posts which contain two or more outgroups (i.e. out-
group mix). 
We observed an ideological frame extension 14  that often addresses 
new themes while maintaining hostility against migrants and Muslims 
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as a key issue. This frame extension is mainly created through the use 
of the “piggybacking” tactic,15  where the user mixes trending hashtags 
with some extremist ones as a means of infiltrating mainstream trending 
topics.
Extremist leaders were regularly framed as inspiring figures in three ac-
counts. Positive ingroup values and ways of life (European identity, cultu-
re, heterosexuality, etc.) were observed in every profile. 
Lastly, our analysis delivered results for three solutions constructs. The 
apology for non-violent reaction (e.g., participation in demonstrations 
or meetings) was observed in every account. Ambiguous calls to actions 
were also identified in all accounts. Posts expressing apologies for vio-
lence were observed in the two French accounts (ANR and PNF). With I3, 
these accounts are the same ones that frame extremist leaders as inspi-
ring figures.
10) Are there differences between Facebook and Insta-
gram for extreme right propaganda? 
The profiles differ greatly: they oppose different outgroups and combine 
the crisis-identity-solution frames in different ways. Interestingly, we ob-
served that the visual strategies across the two platforms were not signifi-
cantly different from each other. While EI takes advantage of Instagram’s 
visual nature, with hipsterish images and vague rhetoric (often taking the 
form of narcissistic ideas of self-love,16  the other two Instagram profiles, 
namely EI and NRW, prefer to publish the same types of content that we 
found on their Facebook pages.
11) What did we learn about extreme right communica-
tion styles/discourse patterns? 
Apologies for violence and inspiring banned extremist figures, both con-
stituting a breach of Facebook’s terms of service, were rather uncom-
mon. At the other end of the spectrum, ambiguous calls for action that 
play cat-and-mouse with Facebook’s content rules were prevalent in 
some cases. In total, we observed six cat-and-mouse discourse patterns 
and five explicit apologies for violence, some of which are similar to those 
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used in Islam-based extremist propaganda:
- Extremist figures as inspiring:
- Ambiguous calls for action:
- Apologies for violence:
Doublespeak, which allows ideological innocence,17  was particularly ob-
served. The message is vague and implicit enough to circumvent hate 
speech regulations but is, at the same time, clear enough to be understo-
od as extremist ideas. While hardcore extremism has long since switched 
from public accounts to private ones or other platforms, Facebook and 
Instagram’s public profiles can still represent points of entry to extremist 
ideology. EI perfectly illustrates this mainstreaming process. While most 
of the posts are graphically more reminiscent of perfume ads than of ex-
tremist propaganda, posts like the one with the slogan “Hail Europe” with 
a European village in the background reminds us that the coding game 
with the Nazi repertoire is not far off. 
■ Promotion of extreme-right figures through future or past political 
events
■ Quotes from an extremist figure 
■ Visual portrait-tribute with years of birth and death, coupled with the 
organisation’s logo in the image, and quote in the text section
■ Logo of a banned organisation coupled with explicit support in the 
text section
■ Vague rhetoric of fight or defence
■ Inclusiveness of all means of defence
■ Endorsement of violent acts in text and in image (e.g., the Chemnitz 
incident)
■ Textual call for death in extended crisis descriptions, coupled with an 
image illustrating the crisis
■ Violent imagery against a specific outgroup (e.g., antifa)
■ Violent imagery coupled with a textual call for violence against a 
specific group
■ Decontextualization of the third Reich’s army’s pictures
16PRECOBIAS - scientific report
Prevention of Youth Radicalisation Through 
Self-Awareness on Cognitive Biases
12) How do radical posts affect cognitive biases?
The analysis of the social media posts revealed that cognitive biases mi-
ght be triggered by certain stylistics and narratives. To shed light on the 
radicalization process and identify what measures need to be taken to 
lever out effects of radicalization, we conducted a survey experiment. In 
this, we included three biases that were particularly prevalent in extre-
mist content and presented them in the style of Instagram-like Internet 
memes, as they would typically be presented on social media. 
A sample of 393 people participated in our study. They started out to an-
swer some questions about their general values and worldviews, then 
they saw social media posts that we created for the purpose of this expe-
riment. We decided to test three different, commonly encountered nar-
ratives as they might relate differently to cognitive biases and the radi-
calization process. All three narratives related to the migrant situation in 
Europe, which was prevalent in the public discourse at the time of the 
experiment, because of the conflict situation between the EU and Tur-
key. The chosen narratives for the experiment were based on statements 
that could be encountered in comment sections of newspapers and all 
respondents were extensively briefed about the content of the question-
naire to ensure an ethical process. The following three narratives were 
tested: 
(A) Radicalization often draws on the concept of an enemy that is seen 
in established structures and systems. We therefore worked with a nar-
rative that referenced elite-critique. We presented three postings that 
talked about how the political elite has “failed the people” in the eye of 
the migrant situation in Europe and how it was time to look for alternati-
ve solutions. 
(B) For the ingroup-outgroup narrative, we again showed very similar po-
sts, but we explicitly referred to migrants as the outgroup that the people 
needed to join against. 
(C) For the violence narrative, we included explicit invocations of violence 
against migrants. 
We compared these three extremist narratives to posts that either discus-
sed a topic totally unrelated to politics, or we showed them posts that 
presented political views on the migrant situation but in a very objective 
and calm manner. After our respondents saw the posts, they answered 
questions to assess whether the posts triggered the three cognitive bia-
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ses. Afterwards, we asked for their extremist attitudes and assessments 
of the presented posts. Since we know from extant research that not all 
humans are equally vulnerable to extremist attitudes, we also analyzed 
whether people with high levels of authoritarianism reacted more stron-
gly to extremist messages. 
At the end of the study, respondents were educated about the source of 
the posts. We distanced ourselves from the radical content, and we pro-
vided additional information on extremism online as well as responsible 
regulatory organizations. This is a so-called debriefing process that ensu-
res there are no long-lasting effects on the participants. 
1. Ingroup-outgroup bias
The so-called ingroup-outgroup bias describes a superior view of one’s 
own ingroup while simultaneously downgrading outgroup members.18 
The analysis of extremist posts described under point 3-11 has shown that 
radical messages strongly use narratives that try to show a positive image 
of the ingroup and build a strong sense of community, while highlighting 
the negative characteristics of the outgroup. Moreover, a strong sense of 
community with the ingroup and conflicts with outgroup members can 
foster radicalization processes. 
As far as our results are concerned, we found that a single exposure to 
radical materials did not increase the ingroup-outgroup bias.  However, 
if people in general held this belief, the ingroup-outgroup bias was posi-
tively associated with people’s extremist attitudes. That is, the higher the 
ingroup-outgroup bias was present, the higher the extremist attitudes. 
Holding the belief of a better ingroup was more common in people who 
were also more authoritarian. Hence, people who longed for a strong lea-
der and a more authoritarian system were more likely to believe that their 
ingroup was superior.  
2. Negativity Bias
As also shown in the analysis of radical material online, these posts often 
reference very negative narratives by showing victims of war, expressing 
threats and violence, as well as focusing on the fall of an existing, hostile 
social order. We thought that these negative associations could maybe 
raise more awareness in Internet users and could activate extremist at-
titudes. This is formalized in the so-called negativity bias which outlines 
that humans tend to respond more strongly to negative content.19  This 
relates to the explanation stemming from evolution that humans are in-
clined to watch out for threats to ensure survival.20  Thus, humans tend to 
respond more strongly to negative stimuli, which is showcased in closer 
attention to, and better memory for, negative information. 
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In our results, when posts tackled a political issue or when they were ra-
ther explicit in their radical ideas, they were also perceived as more ne-
gative. Not surprisingly, then, violent posts showed the highest effect on 
negativity bias, followed by elite critique and lastly the ingroup-outgroup 
narrative. When a person was less authoritarian, he or she reacted with 
a more pronounced negativity bias to the posts. However, a bias towards 
negativity did not influence the extremist attitudes in a person. The in-
tention to like or share the posts was lower when it triggered a higher 
negativity bias. Hence, while extremist narratives certainly gained atten-
tion, they did not contribute to extremist attitudes or sharing this content 
online. 
3. Just-world hypothesis
The analysis of extremists’ posts has indicated that victimization of mem-
bers of the ingroup and targeting outgroup members with violent in-
vocations and threats is a relevant frame. If readers are confronted with 
such presentations, they need to deal with the depictions of injustice. A 
common bias that can work as a coping mechanism is the just-world 
hypothesis. This bias describes the belief that the world is a just place 
and, therefore, people generally get what they deserve.21  To obtain this 
world view, a victim’s circumstances often will be connected to her own 
actions and/or character. The belief that a victim of cruelty and violence 
might have played a role in these actions shields the observer from the 
reality of an unjust world and thus allows a preservation of their own well-
being.22
With our study, we found that the violence narrative activated the 
just-world belief more than the other posts. Hence, when confronted with 
invocations of violence, the belief of the world as a just place increased. 
This is probably a coping mechanism to deal with the presented content. 
Holding just-world views, then, can translate into extremist attitudes, be-
cause beliefs of victims being in part responsible for violence and threa-
ts they experience as normalization of extremist views. People who hold 
authoritarian beliefs were also more inclined to holding just-world views. 
13) What are the main results of the effect perspective?
- Extremist narratives on social media can trigger a negativity bias in just 
one exposure. The negativity bias, however, plays no role in holding extre-
mist attitudes. 
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- While an ingroup-outgroup bias cannot be built through a single expo-
sure to extremist posts, holding beliefs of one’s ingroup being superior to 
an outgroup positively relates to higher levels of extremist attitudes. 
- Violence narratives in posts increased just-world beliefs, which are rela-
ted to higher extremist attitudes. 
- Holding authoritarian attitudes made just-world beliefs and in-
group-outgroup biases more likely, while they decreased the negativity 
bias to some extent. 
- In addition, our results indicate that violence narratives directly increase 
extremist attitudes. This might lead back to the normalization of extre-
mist opinions through violent social media posts.
14) What is the project take-away?
Cognitive biases shape how humans process information and are rele-
vant in the decision-making process of our day-to-day lives. Extremists 
have found ways, however, to take advantage of these biases and sub-
consciously, or sometimes consciously, include them in their employed 
stylistics and narratives. If these biases are activated, that also makes us 
more vulnerable to extremist attitudes, particularly if people are already 
drawn to authoritarian attitudes. Educating the public about the ways 
cognitive biases impact media perceptions and information processing 
and how they can be enforced in content we are confronted with online, 
therefore, seems to be an important media literacy endeavour. 
Want to know more?
These findings are further developed in scientific papers that will be pu-
blished on our website www.precobias.eu in the upcoming months. Don’t 
hesitate to download them!
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